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THE CASE AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS
STEPHEN 1. VLADECK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Calls for a special judicial forum to resolve questions arising out
of the detention and incapacitation of suspected terrorists are nothing
new. Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001, suggestions
within the United States that certain terrorism-related legal questions
should be resolved before hybrid tribunals operating under different
rules had received a fair amount of attention. Thus, in 1996, for
example, Congress created the specialized Alien Terrorist Removal
Court (ATRC) to process-behind closed doors-the deportation of
non-citizens suspected of involvement in international terrorism.'
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself had hinted that the relevant
constitutional considerations might vary where terrorism was
concerned. In its last decision before September 11, the Court held
that the potentially indefinite detention of a non-citizen pending
deportation violated the Due Process Clause, but was equally clear
that its decision did not "consider terrorism or other special
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of
preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of
the political branches with respect to matters of national security."2
* Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law. This paper
was prepared for (and presented at) the Willamette University College of Law's 125th
Anniversary Symposium on "Presidential Power in the 21st Century," for my participation in
which I owe thanks to Norman Williams. Thanks also to Sara Cassidey, Lee Ann Donaldson,
Dorothy Ryan, and the staff of the Willamette Law Review for their editorial guidance and
their patience, and to Maureen Roach for invaluable research assistance.
1. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32,
§ 401, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-68 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37 (2000)). To
date, there have been no reported proceedings before the ATRC. See Stephen Townley, The
Use and Misuse of Secret Evidence in Immigration Cases: A Comparative Study of the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 234 n.126 (2007). The
ATRC was itself modeled after the so-called "FISA Court," created by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978. See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2000).
2. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).
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Since September 11, calls for a hybrid "national security" court
to handle such circumstances have taken on a newfound prominence,
as courts and policymakers alike have struggled with the complex
series of legal and logistical problems posed by the U.S.
government's detention of "enemy combatants," especially the
hundreds of non-citizens so detained at Guantdinamo Bay, Cuba.
Moreover, whereas the vast bulk of these proposals were initially
promulgated in academic circles, 3 the past two years have seen
increasing calls for such hybrid tribunals in the popular press,
including a Wall Street Journal op-ed by Attorney General Mukasey,
4
and a New York Times op-ed co-authored by Neal Katyal (who
successfully brought the Hamdan case to the Supreme Court)5 and
Jack Goldsmith, the former director of the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel. 6 As the Goldsmith/Katyal op-ed itself
suggests, national security courts are, for many, an increasingly
attractive compromise solution to the seemingly irreconcilable
division between those who believe that terrorism suspects are not
entitled to the traditional criminal process and those who believe not
only that they are, but that any other system is categorically
unconstitutional. And in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Boumediene v. Bush last June, 8 holding that the
Guant~namo detainees have a constitutional right to petition the
federal courts for writs of habeas corpus, such a "compromise"
3. Some of the more detailed discussions include ANDREW C. MCCARTHY & ALYKHAN
VELSHI, WE NEED A NATIONAL SECURITY COURT (2006), available at
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/images/stories/national security court.pdf; Harvey Rishikof,
Is It Time for a Federal Terrorist Court? Terrorists and Prosecutions: Problems, Paradigms,
and Paradoxes, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1 (2003); Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal
Landscape After Hamdan: The Creation of Homeland Security Courts, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1 (2006); Amos Guiora & John T. Parry, Debate, Light at the End of the
Pipeline?: Choosing a Forum for Suspected Terrorists, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 356
(2008). The most thorough academic treatment of the risks posed by adherence to the pre-
September 11 models is Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1079 (2008).
4. Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed., Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,
2007, at A15.
5. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
6. Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 2007, at A19. To be fair, Professor Katyal (who is now the principal Deputy Solicitor
General) subsequently retreated somewhat from the initial op-ed. See Neal Katyal, A National
Security Court: Not Now, Not Yet, GEO. SEC. L. COMMENTARY, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.securitylawbrief.com/commentary/2008/10/a-national-secu.html.
7. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 6.
8. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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solution has become all the more appealing, given both the judicial
review that the Supreme Court's decision mandates and the
complexity of the issues that it nevertheless leaves unresolved.9
As popular as such proposals have been, though, there has been
little sustained discussion of their details, which have seldom been
fleshed out. Even with respect to those calls for national security
courts including some discussion of the specifics, the proposals vary
widely both substantively and procedurally. For example, some
proponents have called for national security courts for detention
decisions-to review whether a particular terrorism suspect can be
held as an enemy combatant without criminal charges.' 0 Others have
called for such tribunals as a forum in which to criminally prosecute
suspected terrorists-as an alternative either to the traditional Article
III criminal process" or to trial by military commission pursuant to
the controversial Military Commissions Act of 2006.12 Whatever the
merits of each individual proposal, little has been written about the
broader implications of such a "third way."
In the article that follows, I attempt to provide a comprehensive
introduction to the various proposals for a national security court, and
to suggest some of the pros and cons of these efforts. Part II begins
by summarizing the proposals and their differences, especially the
distinction between detention-related national security courts and
national security courts for criminal prosecution. In Part III, the
article turns to the fundamental questions implicated by the debate
over national security courts. Finally, Part IV considers whether,
ultimately, we need national security courts.
Ultimately, I argue that proposals for national security courts are
dangerously myopic proxies for larger debates that must first be
resolved, including, most prominently, the debate over the extent to
which the government should be able to preventively detain terrorism
9. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo Courts, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 172, 172 (2008) (noting the impact of Boumediene on reform
proposals).
10. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 6.
I1. Indeed, even during World War II, individuals within the United States suspected of
giving aid and comfort to the enemy were tried in civilian criminal courts, rather than
subjected to military detention and/or trial. See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten
Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863
(2006).
12. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18,
and 28 U.S.C.). On the potential overbreadth of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, see
Vladeck, supra note 9, at 173.
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suspects, and the equally significant definitional question of just who
qualifies as such an individual. 13  Until and unless meaningful
progress is made on these issues, calls for national security courts are
little more than form without substance.
II. NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS: THE PROPOSALS
A. The Nature of Terrorism and the Need for a "Third Way"
At the heart of each argument for a national security court is the
assertion that the "traditional" models of criminal process or military
detention are inadequate to deal with the particular nature of the threat
posed by international terrorism. As Professors Chesney and
Goldsmith describe:
Neither model in its traditional guise can easily meet the central
legal challenge of modem terrorism: the legitimate preventive
incapacitation of uniformless terrorists who have the capacity to
inflict mass casualties and enormous economic harms and who
thus must be stopped before they act. The traditional criminal
model, with its demanding substantive and procedural
requirements, is the most legitimate institution for long-term
incapacitation. But it has difficulty achieving preventive
incapacitation. Traditional military detention, by contrast,
combines associational detention criteria with procedural
flexibility to make it relatively easy to incapacitate. But because
the enemy in this war operates clandestinely, and because the war
has no obvious end, this model runs an unusually high risk of
erroneous long-term detentions, and thus in its traditional guise
lacks adequate legitimacy. 
14
Thus, on their view (and that of many others), the central
difficulty is that the criminal model is insufficiently preventative and
thus dangerously underbroad, while the military model is
insufficiently accurate and thus dangerously overbroad-assuming
that the military model can be applied to terrorism at all, a point that
has itself been hotly contested.
13. Indeed, in a draft white paper released as this article went to print, Jack Goldsmith
argued that, for this very reason, proposals for a national security court are a "canard." See
Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security Court (Feb. 4,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/
papers/2009/0209 detention-goldsmith/0209_detention-goldsmith.pdf. On that point, at least,
he and I are in complete agreement.
14. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1081.
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In addition, incapacitating terrorism suspects raises unique
problems because of the nature of terrorism itself. The Bush
Administration consistently maintained that, no matter what, it had to
have the ability to extract information from terrorism suspects in
order to adequately protect against future attacks.15 Whatever view
one takes of the merits of that suggestion, it is certainly true that
interrogation of detainees is heavily regulated and proscribed in both
traditional models. Miranda v. Arizona'6 and its successors tightly
constrain the government's ability to interrogate criminal suspects;
the laws of war generally, and the Geneva Conventions specifically,
tightly constrain the government's ability to interrogate those held
pursuant to the laws of war.17
Finally, regardless of which side they take, most commentators
agree that the status quo is unacceptable. Because of the patchwork
system that has emerged since September 11, there seems to be no
single clear set of criteria to apply to any individual case. Instead,
individuals picked up in entirely similar circumstances have been met
with entirely different treatment for reasons that are beyond public
view-if they exist at all. Even the term "enemy combatant" was
wanting for a statutory definition until more than five years after
September 11. No matter the reasons for such a lack of clarity, its
impact has been profound-and incredibly deleterious both to U.S.
interests abroad and to real progress (and perhaps even security) at
home.
Thus, there is a perceived need for a third way. But a third way
for what? For preventive detention? For long-term incapacitation
pursuant to conviction? For both? The proverbial devil, ultimately, is
in the details.
B. National Security Courts for "Detention" Decisions
Perhaps the less disturbing proposal for a national security court
is with respect to reviewing the decision to detain a terrorism suspect
preventatively. Of course, such proposals assume-as they must-
that preventative detention is not inherently unconstitutional, which is
hardly a settled proposition (and one considered in more depth
15. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Torture Acknowledgment Highlights Detainee Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at Al.
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti, Letters Give C.IA. Tactics a Legal Rationale, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2008, at Al.
2009]
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below). 18 Nonetheless, proceeding off that assumption, proposals for
detention-related national security courts have generally extolled such
courts as the best way to ensure that preventative detention is not
overbroad, and that both substantive and procedural rules are applied
fairly and effectively. 19 Calls for national security courts for
"detention" decisions are therefore invariably cast as a better way to
protect the rights of the detainees than the status quo.
That depends, though, on what the status quo actually is.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene,
20
substantial questions remain concerning both the scope and the
adequacy of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT)
process2 '-along with the D.C. Circuit's review thereof.22 Separate
from the CSRT process, the D.C. district court has struggled mightily
in the months since Boumediene sorting out the scope of its authority
to adjudicate the detainees' habeas petitions,23 especially given the
D.C. Circuit's decision in Kiyemba v. Obama (notwithstanding
Boumediene) that the Guantdnamo detainees have no substantive
constitutional rights.24 And, perhaps even more fundamentally, the en
banc Fourth Circuit divided bitterly over whether the detention
authorized by the September 18, 2001 Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF) 25 extends to the detention of non-citizens
arrested within the United States; a question answered in the negative
18. In his dissent in the Hamdi case, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, was
adamant that, where U.S. citizens held within the United States are concerned, the Constitution
only authorizes detention without trial pursuant to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus-
a measure that has, as yet, not been a serious part of any of the post-September 11 legislation
or proposals. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 6.
20. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
21. The CSRTs were initially created in July 2004, in response to the Supreme Court's
Rasul and Hamdi decisions, and were designed to provide some review of the government's
determination that individuals detained at Guantinamo Bay had been properly classified as
"enemy combatants." See id. at 2233 (discussing the CSRTs).
22. See Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2960
(2008); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In January 2009, the D.C. Circuit even
suggested that the CSRT process (or, at least, its jurisdiction to entertain appeals from CSRTs)
did not survive Boumediene. See Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
This is a holding that is rather inconsistent with Boumediene itself. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct.
at 2275 ("[B]oth the DTA and the CSRT process remain intact.").
23. Compare, e.g., In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 570 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C.
2008), with In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008).
24. See No. 08-5424, 2009 WL 383618 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) (holding that the
Guantdnamo detainees have no due process rights).
25. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
[45:505
NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS
by a three-judge panel of the same court. 2 6 One 5-4 majority of the
court recently concluded that the detention was authorized (although
the judges were completely unable to agree on the proper substantive
standard for detention). 27 A different 5-4 alignment of the court,
though, concluded that the detainee-al Marri-had not received
sufficient process.28 And although the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in December 2008,29 the Obama Administration
successfully mooted the case by indicting al Marri and transferring
him to civilian custody.
30
Thus, attempts to argue against the status quo in the context of
preventative detention are, in effect, attempts to hit a moving target.
One potential (albeit extreme) outcome of the current cases is a
narrow conception of the category of those who may lawfully be
detained and a broad conception of the detainees' ability to challenge
their detention in federal court. The other extreme would yield a
broad definition of who can be detained and a narrow ability to
challenge that detention. Where a national security court would fit in
depends to a large degree on what results from the current litigation,
including the limits that might be imposed by the Supreme Court-a
point almost entirely overlooked by the proponents of such a tribunal.
Moreover, regardless of how the current cases are decided, such
proposals must resolve four additional issues: (1) The nature and
authority of the presiding judges; (2) the substantive criteria
identifying the class of individuals subject to detention; (3) the
procedure by which the initial decision is made; and (4) the
mechanisms for review, both at the time of the initial decision and in
the months and years thereafter.
Frustratingly, most of the proposals get this far, but go into very
little additional detail, focusing instead on repetitive arguments for
why the traditional models are inadequate. One of the more principled
proposals is that offered by Katyal and Goldsmith, who argue that the
26. al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007).
27. See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 680 (2008).
28. See id.
29. See al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 680 (mem.). In the interests of full disclosure, I should note
that I co-authored amicus briefs in al-Marri both in support of certiorari and in favor of the
Petitioner on the merits.
30. See al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2009)
(granting the government's application to transfer al Marri to civilian custody, vacating the en
banc Fourth Circuit's decision, and remanding to that court with instructions to dismiss).
2009]
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decision-makers should be life-tenured Article III judges, selected by
the Chief Justice in the same way as the judges on various specialized
Article III courts (including, as an important related example, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review). 31
Although Katyal and Goldsmith believe that "traditional" procedural
and evidentiary rules should be relaxed, they nevertheless trumpet
that:
The court would have a permanent staff of elite defense lawyers
with special security clearances as part of its permanent staff.
Defense lawyers trained in the nuances of taking apart
interrogation statements, particularly translated statements, are
crucial because often the legal proceedings will involve little else
in the way of evidence.
32
They also argue for meaningful appellate review from the initial
decision, for review of whether there is "a continuing rationale to
detain people years after their initial cases were heard, 3 3 and,
importantly, for the collapsing of any distinction between citizens and
non-citizens.34
Missing from their proposal, though, are two critical points: The
burden of proof, and, more basically, the substantive criteria for
detention-the definition of who can be held, if the evidence so
provides, and, as importantly, who must be released. Thus, even while
arguing that courts should continually review whether there is a
"continuing rationale" for detention, Katyal and Goldsmith decline to
offer what such a rationale might be. And these are hardly trifling
details. To the contrary, these questions go to the heart of the
problem: Just who would such a regime apply to, and under how
much (and what) evidence? Without these details, it is difficult-if
not impossible-to truly assess the extent to which such a proposal is
even a departure from prevailing norms, let alone a departure that is
warranted.
Other proposals suffer from similar defects. Thus, in the
American Enterprise Institute white paper prepared by Andrew
McCarthy and Alykhan Velshi,35 perhaps the most detailed and
widely circulated proposal to date, the authors propose a national
31. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 6.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See MCCARTHY & VELSHI, supra note 3.
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security court for both detention decisions and criminal prosecutions
(more on the latter below); the proposal for the former focuses on
who the judges should be and where they should sit.36 In terms of
substance, McCarthy and Velshi propose that the court merely
entertain appeals from the currently established CSRTs at
Guantdnamo Bay,37 a function already assigned to the D.C. Circuit
under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)38 and the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).39
Additionally, given the current legal uncertainty surrounding just
what the D.C. Circuit is entitled to consider in its review of the
CSRTs (or what criteria the D.C. district court should apply in habeas
cases), it is hardly clear from McCarthy and Velshi's proposal what
substantive criteria the new court should follow in such cases, or what
evidentiary burden it should impose. All McCarthy and Velshi seem
to be advocating for is a change in forum from the D.C. federal courts
to the hybridized-and secret-national security court.
If there is to be a regime of preventive detention for at least some
terrorism suspects, it is inevitable that such detention will be subject
to at least some judicial review in some forum, especially after
Boumediene. Thus, the questions these proposals have skirted go
more to the underlying legality of the detention ab initio, rather than
the appropriate forum in which that question should be answered.
C. National Security Courts for Criminal Prosecutions
By far the more controversial-and comprehensive-set of
proposals for a national security court concern criminal prosecutions
of suspected terrorists. Along with the white paper by McCarthy and
Velshi (relied upon by Mukasey), articles by Commander Glenn
Sulmasy and Professor Amos Guiora have expressly called for
prosecutions by hybrid courts as the best way forward for
incapacitating terrorism suspects, and as vastly preferable to trials
either in Article III courtrooms or in military commissions under the
MCA.40
36. See id. at 34.
37. See id. at 40-41.
38. Pub. L. No. 109-48, §§ 1001-1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005).
39. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18,
and 28 U.S.C.).
40. See Guiora & Parry, supra note 3; Sulmasy, supra note 3; MCCARTHY & VELSHI,
supra note 3.
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Unlike preventive detention, where there are fewer established
norms from which the proposals can (and do) deviate, the proposals
for a national security court for criminal prosecutions are replete with
departures from the traditional criminal process. These distinctions
generally run along two axes: the nature of the evidence that may be
introduced (both by the government and by the detainee), and the
means by which that evidence is reviewed (including the prospect that
certain secret evidence be withheld from the detainee). Most
proposals therefore start with perceived constraints of the Article III
process, including: the right to confront witnesses under the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause; the exclusion of hearsay
evidence and evidence obtained through coercion; the right to self-
representation; and the right to a trial by a jury of the defendant's
peers.4' Emphasizing these constraints, proponents of national
security courts suggest that the Article III courts simply are not in a
position to adequately handle such cases, and that any attempt to do
so risks long-term damage to the civilian criminal justice system as a
whole.42
A national security court, in contrast, would be marked by
relaxed evidentiary rules, including the ability to introduce hearsay
testimony and perhaps even evidence that is produced by
governmental coercion.43 As importantly, the government would also
be able, under most proposals, to use classified information as
evidence without fully disclosing such to the defendant. Otherwise, as
McCarthy and Velshi describe in their proposal:
[P]eople who commit mass murder, who face the death penalty or
life imprisonment, and who are devoted members of a movement
whose animating purpose is to damage the United States, are
certain to be relatively unconcerned about violating court orders
(or, for that matter, about being hauled into court at all). Our
congenial rules of access to attorneys, paralegals, investigators and
visitors make it a very simple matter for accused terrorists to
41. The most comprehensive critique in any of the proposals can be found in
MCCARTHY & VELSHI, supra note 3, at 5-13.
42. See, e.g., id. at 13 ("[Tlrials in the criminal justice system don't work for terrorism.
They work for terrorists."). These critiques have elicited sharp and pointed responses. See,
e.g., RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUM. RTS. FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf, Mark R. Shulman,
National Security Courts: Star Chamber or Specialized Justice?, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=l 328427.
43. See, e.g., id. at 41-48.
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transmit what they learn in discovery to their confederates-and
we know that they do so.44
Similarly, but in somewhat more detail, Professor Guiora also
proposes that national security courts have the ability to consider
classified information without disclosure to the defendant:
[I]ntelligence information would be presented in camera by the
prosecutor and a representative of the intelligence services who
would be subject to rigorous cross-examination by the court. The
judges who would sit on the domestic terror courts would be
trained in understanding intelligence information. In addition, the
bench would be expected to fulfill a "double role"-that of fact-
finder and defense counsel alike. As the latter will be barred from
attending the hearings when intelligence information is submitted,
the domestic terror courts would have to proactively engage the
prosecutor. The burden on the court would be enormously
significant because the defendant, who would not be present,
would not have counsel representing him with resWect to the
submission of intelligence information into the record.
In the process, these proposals bemoan as hopelessly inadequate
the provisions of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),46
which prescribe procedures for the use of classified information in
criminal proceedings. The criticisms rest on two separate grounds:
First, proponents of national security courts view CIPA as too
constraining substantively-as too greatly infringing upon the
government's ability to use secret evidence in the abstract. Second,
the proposals also view CIPA as an insufficient protection for the
government's interest in keeping classified information classified-as
insufficiently protecting against the disclosure of such information by
the defendant.
Beyond that, proposals for national security courts for trials of
terrorism suspects are light on the details. As with the proposals for
such tribunals regarding detention decisions, none of the major
proponents identify the substantive criteria that would govern either
the court's personal or subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the
proposals harp upon the ways in which "traditional" evidentiary rules
unduly burden the government's ability to prosecute suspected
terrorists, suggest alternate evidentiary rules, and leave it at that.
44. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
45. Guiora & Parry, supra note 3, at 361.
46. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000).
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D. Common Themes of the Proposals
Once these proposals are placed side-by-side, one conclusion
emerges: The substance of the proposals invariably focuses on
evidentiary issues-the government's need to use: (1) classified
evidence without disclosing that evidence to the terrorism suspect; (2)
evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible in traditional legal
proceedings (e.g., hearsay or coerced statements); or (3) both. In other
words, deviation from the current system is necessary because the
current system cannot adequately handle the evidence the government
might potentially have against terrorism suspects. Even assuming for
the sake of argument that such an assertion is true, the proposals all
skirt the difficult questions that necessarily follow-what limits the
Constitution might place on departures from these standards; what
definition will dictate to whom such departures may be applied; and
so on.
III. THE ASSUMPTIONS PERVADING THE PROPOSALS
As alluded to above, virtually every proposal for a national
security court, in whatever guise, has at its core a series of
assumptions that are not necessarily true. Although the specific
assumptions vary, they fall into four rough groups: (1) that
preventative detention of terrorism suspects is not unlawful; (2) that
CIPA and other evidentiary rules render traditional criminal
prosecutions of terrorism suspects unworkable; (3) that, in general,
the Article III courts are inappropriate forums for terrorism cases; and
(4) that there are no analogous tribunals and/or procedures already
available under extant law. In important ways, each of these
assumptions is incomplete-if not altogether unconvincing.
A. The Lawfulness of Preventive Detention
Without question, the most significant assumption undergirding
the proposals for national security courts is that preventative
detention, in general, is lawful. Thus, with respect to detention
decisions, the various proposals catalogued above might best be
understood as a search for the most appropriate process. But it is
hardly a given that the preventative detention of any terrorism suspect
comports with federal statutes, with the U.S. Constitution, or with
international law.
[45:505
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First, with respect to the Constitution, Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens, at the very least, are on record as believing that the
Constitution prohibits the detention of U.S. citizens without trial
unless Congress has suspended the writ of habeas corpus.47 As Scalia
wrote in his dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the central purpose of the
Constitution's Suspension Clause was to prohibit detention without
trial.48 Although the Court has not gone quite so far, it has repeatedly
reiterated that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only
countenances non-criminal detention in exceptional cases-and even
then, only upon a highly individualized showing by the government
of the threat the detainee poses to society.49
Second, with respect to federal statutes, it is not at all obvious
that the AUMF confers upon the government the authority to detain
any individual determined by the President to be an enemy
combatant. The Hamdi plurality was extremely careful to limit its
endorsement of a power to detain suspected terrorists to "individuals
who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the
Taliban.,, 50 The plurality did not suggest that the AUMF would cut no
more broadly, but it did suggest that the most obvious detention
authority to be found in the statute concerned traditional battlefield
detentions of individuals captured in such a "zone of active
combat." 5'
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Souter-joined
by Justice Ginsburg-noted that even if the AUMF could be read to
support battlefield detentions in the abstract, it would only authorize
the detention of particular individuals consistent with the laws of
war. 52 According to Justice Souter, if the authority to detain enemy
combatants came from the law-of-war-based rule that enemy
combatants on the battlefield are subject to capture and confinement,
such authority was necessarily cabined by its source-the laws of
war.
53
47. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 554
49. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 347-48 (1997) (citations omitted);
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 73-83 (1992) (citations omitted); United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987).
50. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion).
51. See id at 521-24.
52. See id. at 548-51 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment).
53. Id.
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There are thus three levels of distinction to which the proposals
for national security courts are disturbingly indifferent. At most,
Hamdi supports only the proposition that the AUMF authorizes the
preventive detention of enemy combatants captured "on the
battlefield," i.e., in the midst of active combat operations against the
U.S. military in places such as Afghanistan. Even then, if Justice
Souter is correct, such detention must comport with the laws of war,
including the Geneva Conventions. Finally, there is the more
general-but no less important-constitutional question of whether
the government has any power to preventively detain individuals who
are not captured "on the battlefield," a question that divided the en
banc Fourth Circuit in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli.54 Separate from the
unique circumstances of that case, though, and given that a number of
the current Guantdnamo detainees were arrested nowhere near
Afghanistan, these are vexing assumptions, indeed.
B. The Inadequacy of Evidentiary Rules
The second central assumption behind both sets of national
security court proposals (i.e., proposals both for.preventive detention
regimes and quasi-criminal trials for terrorism suspects) is that current
evidentiary rules are inadequate to handle the unique challenges
posed by terrorism cases. Specifically, the bulk of the proposals focus
on two perceived defects with the current process: (1) that CIPA does
not give the government enough flexibility with respect to using
classified information; and (2) that the Federal Rules of Evidence
exclude evidence that should be sufficient to establish a terrorism
suspect's status as an enemy combatant.55
CIPA, of course, is a procedural statute; it alters neither the
substantive rights of the defendant nor the discovery obligations of
the government. At its core, it simply creates procedures through
which the government and the court can best determine how (if at all)
classified information is to be used in a criminal prosecution. 56 The
critical provision of CIPA is section 4, which provides that:
The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United
States to delete specified items of classified information from
54. 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940 (U.S.
Mar. 6, 2009).
55. See, e.g., MCCARTHY & VELSHI, supra note 3, at 11.
56. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 2-16 (2000). See United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 455
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
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documents to be made available to the defendant through
discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
substitute a summary of the information for such classified
documents, or to substitute a statement admittin the relevant facts
that classified information would tend to prove.
Such a showing may be made in camera and ex parte.58 Moreover, if
the district court nevertheless orders the disclosure to the defendant of
classified information, such an order is subject to an immediate and
expedited interlocutory appeal.59
The question nevertheless remains whether CIPA does not allow
the government enough flexibility with respect to the introduction of
classified information in a criminal trial. Although CIPA usually
allows the government to introduce summaries of the classified
material or stipulated facts, in cases where such summaries are
insufficient, it forces the government to choose between disclosure
and sanctions-including the exclusion of all related evidence. 60
The problem with the critiques of CIPA is that they do not
thereby provide support for a national security court: Either these
concerns can be remedied without a new court-simply by amending
CIPA to give greater flexibility to the government-or they cannot be
because such an amendment would call CIPA's constitutionality into
serious question. In other words, either CIPA can be tweaked short of
scrapping the entire system of criminal trials in Article III courts, or it
cannot be because it already represents the constitutional ceiling for
the use of classified information-a line that cannot be transgressed.
A similar problem befalls the evidentiary assumptions at the
heart of most proposals for national security courts. In particular, the
proposals generally focus on the need in individual cases to use
hearsay evidence-evidence that would not generally be admissible in
an Article III court-in order to prove that an individual is in fact an
enemy combatant (and, in the criminal context, has committed a
particular crime). Again, one of two things is necessarily true: Either
the evidentiary rules that would apply to such cases can be modified,
or they cannot be. That is to say, either Congress can amend the
Federal Rules of Evidence to allow for the introduction of particular
forms of evidence in particular cases, or the Constitution prohibits
57. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4.
58. See id. § 6(c)(2).
59. See id. § 7.
60. See, e.g., id. § 6(e).
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Congress from so acting. The former would suggest that a move to a
national security court would be akin to using a bazooka to kill an ant;
the latter would suggest that national security courts couldn't have a
lesser evidentiary burden.
C. The Existence (and Ignorance) of Precedent
Finally, what cannot be gainsaid about the proposals discussed in
Part II is that they all assume that, whether we need national security
courts or not, we do not at present have them. This assumption is
critical, because the vast majority of the proposals rely upon the
inadequacy of the current system as proof of the need for a third way.
Thus, one key question is whether the mechanisms for which their
proponents are arguing already exist (or at least have existed in other
forms in the past). The precedents surveyed below bring these
questions into sharp relief, and suggest that some of the elements of
the current proposals have already been tried, and rejected.
1. Precedents Reborn: Alien Enemies and Emergency Detention
The Japanese-American internment camps during World War II
are not the only example in American history of preventive detention
of individuals during wartime (or other national security emergencies)
simply as a means of incapacitation. The Alien Enemy Act of 1798,
which remains on the books today, provides that during a declared
war, "all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation
or government, being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who
shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be
liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien
enemies.' 6' Although the Alien Enemy Act would obviously be of no
help in incapacitating terrorism suspects (who are often nationals of
our allies), another more recent example-the much-maligned
Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (EDA)62 -might provide a better
exemplar.
The EDA, passed as part of the Internal Security Act of 1950,
provided a detailed and sophisticated mechanism for the detention of
suspected Communists (or other potential saboteurs or
61. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3-21 (2000). See Stephen 1. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property,
and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 963 (2007), for a survey of the Act and
its mostly unexplored jurisprudence.
62. Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 1024, 64 Stat. 987, 1019-31 (1950) (repealed 1971).
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insurrectionists) during a declared "internal security emergency. 63
The statute provided for detailed administrative review of the
detentions within 48 hours of the initial arrest, with subsequent
appeals to the federal courts.64 The EDA was hotly criticized, and was
ultimately repealed in 1971 (largely as a symbolic repudiation of the
internment camps from World War 11)65 in the same statute in which
Congress enacted the so-called "Non-Detention Act," 18 U.S.C.
§4001(a), which provides that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained except pursuant to an Act of Congress." 66 Given
the significance of the repeal of the EDA, one question for current
proponents of a national security court for detention decisions is
whether the reasons for repeal of the EDA in 1971 are less salient
today.
2. Mandatory Detention and the USA PATRIOTAct
Along lines echoing the EDA, six weeks after September 11,
Congress expressly provided for the short-term detention of suspected
terrorists in section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorizes
the Attorney General to detain any non-citizen "engaged in any...
activity that endangers the national security of the United States. 67
In other words, the USA PATRIOT Act provides the government
with statutory detention authority to detain any non-citizen terrorism
suspect without charges, albeit for a short period of time. Critically,
the mandatory detention provision expressly contemplates review of
the detention decision, both internally by the Attorney General, and
externally via petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the D.C. federal
district court.68 That the U.S. government has, to date, declined to
exercise its authority under the statute does not vitiate its applicability
to potential future cases.
63. Id.
64. For helpful academic discussions of the EDA, see Richard Longaker, Emergency
Detention: The Generation Gap, 1950-1971, 27 W. POL. Q. 395 (1974), and Leslie W. Dunbar,
Beyond Korematsu: The Emergency Detention Act of1950, 13 U. PiTT. L. REv. 221 (1952).
65. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 153,
178-80 (2004).
66. Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a)).
67. Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350-
52 (2001) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).
68. See id.
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3. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
Separate from the USA PATRIOT Act, the U.S. government has
already established a process to decide whether terrorism suspects can
be detained as enemy combatants-the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (CSRTs) launched in July 2004 and noted above.69
Although the CSRTs are composed only of military officers, and
provide exceedingly minimal process, the DTA confers upon the
detainees a statutory right to appeal their CSRT determination to the
D.C. Circuit,70  and Boumediene recognizes the Guantdinamo
detainees' right to petition for habeas corpus review in the D.C.
district court. 71 Thus, in a sense, the D.C. federal courts are already
functioning as national security courts.72
4. The Military Commissions Act of 2006
Although the Supreme Court in Hamdan73 invalidated the
military tribunals created by President Bush pursuant to a November
2001 Executive Order,74 Congress responded by enacting the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The MCA provides the executive
branch with sweeping authority to try any "alien unlawful enemy
combatant," which the MCA defines as a non-citizen who "who has
engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents
who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part
of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)., 75 Thus, the MCA
could theoretically apply to any non-citizen who provides "material
support" to a group involved in hostilities against the United States or
its co-belligerents. In addition, the MCA, in new 10 U.S.C. § 950v,
authorizes trial by military commission for a wide range of criminal
offenses, ranging from traditional war crimes to "conspiracy,"
69. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
70. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-48, § 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. 2680,
2742-43.
71. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
72. As noted above, what the D.C. Circuit can actually review on appeal is an issue of
significant current debate. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. At bottom, though, the
D.C. district court has habeas jurisdiction over the Guantdnamo detainees.
73. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
74. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 10).
75. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(l), 120 Stat. 2600,
2601 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(A)).
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"terrorism," and the provision of "material support" thereto.76 If the
MCA is constitutional in relevant respects, 77 then it authorizes the
trial by military commission for an exceptionally broad class of
offenders and an exceptionally broad class of offenses.
Moreover, trials pursuant to the MCA would be conducted under
drastically different evidentiary rules. Although the MCA prohibits
convictions obtained solely on the basis of irrebuttable evidence and
bars the introduction of evidence obtained through torture, new
10 U.S.C. §§ 948r and 949a(b)(2) expressly authorize the introduction
of certain hearsay testimony and of statements obtained through
coercion, in addition to evidence gathered through unlawful
searches.78
The MCA specifically, and the other examples discussed above
more generally, raise two fundamental challenges to proposals for
national security courts: Either (1) the substantive provisions of these
statutes are constitutional, and effectively create a legal regime
mirroring the extant proposals (rendering such proposals
unnecessary); or (2) the provisions are unconstitutional, a fate that
would likely befall proposals for national security courts along similar
lines.
IV. Do WE NEED NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS?
Assuming that the assumptions documented in Part III are valid,
that leaves the central question: Do we really need national security
courts? Put another way, are the problems identified by proponents of
national security courts worth a solution? Even if they are, are hybrid
tribunals the answer?
Philosophically, proposals for national security courts are, in
many respects, proxies for larger debates that have been ongoing
since shortly after September 11. Thus, inextricably bound up in
proposals for national security courts is the assertion that neither the
traditional criminal paradigm nor the traditional military paradigm is
adequate to handle the unique problems posed by international
terrorism. Proposals for national security courts thus attempt to avoid
answering the question of whether terrorism is war or crime.
76. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2625-30 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950v).
77. For a short synopsis of the arguments against the constitutionality of these
provisions, see Vladeck, supra note 9, at 178-80.
78. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2607-09 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948r and 949a(b)(2)).
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What is perhaps so disconcerting about the proposals, then, is the
extent to which proposals for national security courts for detention
decisions resemble the currently prevailing military paradigm, and the
extent to which proposals for national security courts for criminal
prosecutions resemble the currently prevailing criminal paradigm.
The former set of proposals focus on the ability to incapacitate
terrorism suspects for a long period of time, and trifle mostly over
what evidence can be used in reviewing the decision to detain. The
latter set focus on the ability to prosecute terrorism suspects in courts,
albeit non-Article III courts, and, again, trifle over what evidence can
be used in attempting to convict the defendant of the charges against
him. If neither paradigm is apt, why hew so closely to their traditional
structures?
At their core, proposals for national security courts suggest that,
as a legal system, we do not want to relax the rules in all cases-just
those involving terrorism suspects. And yet, that's precisely the nub
of the problem; even if one were tempted to ignore Justice
Frankfurter's celebrated admonition that "[i]t is a fair summary of
history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been
forged in controversies involving not very nice people[,]"79 that still
leaves the threshold definitional question unanswered: Just who are
the terrorism suspects who can be subjected to this "third" way, and
what checks are there to protect against false positives? By focusing
so much on evidentiary issues, proposals for national security courts
proceed on the assumption that these questions are either unimportant
or have already been answered. Neither, though, is true.
Ultimately, proposals for national security courts are thought-
provoking, but dangerously incomplete. The idea that there is a class
of individuals for whom neither the criminal nor military paradigms
suffice presupposes that such a class of individuals is readily
identifiable. The idea that national security courts are a proper third
way for dealing with such individuals presupposes that the purported
defects in the current system are ones that cannot adequately be
remedied within the confines of the current system, and yet can be
remedied in hybrid tribunals without violating the Constitution.
Whether such a tightrope could be successfully navigated or not, the
extant proposals for national security courts do exceedingly little to
bridge that gap. In short, we cannot have a serious debate over the
need for national security courts until and unless we first resolve
79. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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critical questions as to the scope of the government's authority to
incapacitate terrorism suspects, and the scope of those suspects'
constitutional rights vis-A-vis the government.
Deliberately, I have not tried to suggest answers to these
questions in the above pages. Indeed, I think it tautological that
reasonable people will disagree as to what the government can and
cannot do. And in any event, it cannot be gainsaid that it will be years
before we have a full accounting of the myriad legal and policy
questions that terrorism-related detentions engender. I have my own
views, to be sure, but they are immaterial here. Rather, the central
thesis of this article is that a system of national security courts would
only further perpetuate the extant uncertainty, providing more
questions than answers.
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